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FOREWORD

CRIME AND CORRECTIONS
ROBERT

H. VASOLI"

A society can be examined from as many perspectives as
there are observers and substantive areas of study. Historians, economists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and representatives of many other disciplines as well
have all enriched our understanding of the world around us.
But with all due respect to the contributions they have made,
it would not be amiss to suggest that the study of a society's
criminal justice system might well provide as much valid insight into its Zeitgeist as more conventional modes of analysis. In that vein, it is of more than passing interest to note
that Alexis de Tocqueville's primary mission when he first
visited the United States was to examine our penitentiaries.
His incomparable Democracy in America was preceded by On
the Penitentiary System in the United States, a work he co-authored with Gustave de Beaumont.
The criminal justice system is a vast socio-legal entity, encompassing the police, prosecutors, courts, correctional institutions, and probation and parole systems. It is a major service industry, employing tens of thousands and processing
and ministering to millions. More than a million federal and
state offenders are under probation supervision, another half
million or so in prisons, and in any given year better than a
million citizens pass through the nation's jails. Countless
others, while not among the system's official functionaries,
are symbiotically related to it as criminal defense attorneys,
bail bondsmen, unpaid citizen volunteers, witnesses, and as
victims.
No single symposium can hope or pretend to cover-or
even touch-all bases of an advanced society's criminal justice system. This symposium is no exception to that general
rule of feasibility. Nonetheless, it deals at length with issues
that are current, controversial, and of considerable interest:
organized crime, the disposition of dangerous offenders, the
privatization of corrections, sentencing, and the forfeiture of
* Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Notre Dame.
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"tainted" attorney's fees. As is the case with most if not all
issues in criminal justice, those dealt with herein cannot be
resolved in a definitive way. But while the contributions to
this symposium do not each and severally constitute the final
word, they are scholarly and provocative.
The magnitude and complexity of America's criminal
justice system, besides creating problems in its effective operation, make it an inviting and vulnerable target for criticism.
The difficulties engendered by size and intricacy are compounded by the fact that, including the military justice system
and the District of Columbia, there are fifty-three separate
major jurisdictions. As if this were not enough, the system is
expected to perform multiple and often conflicting functions.
In corrections, for example, the prisons have been variously
called upon to punish, deter, incapacitate, and rehabilitate.
And they have been expected to perform these competing
functions simultaneously, despite chronic budgetary and staffing constraints. Gordon Hawkins, summarizing studies of
prison guards, comments that they were "asked to perform
impossible tasks without being properly trained to perform
even possible ones." 1 The plight of the guard is typical of
that of the criminal justice system overall. It, too, is expected
to perform wondrous feats without the resources to do that
which is altogether pedestrian.
It is not surprising, then, that few kind words are said of
our criminal justice system these days. Dissatisfaction with the
system is ubiquitous and unrelenting, and it emanates from
every ideological quarter. Conservatives rue the system's porosity and permissiveness, its preoccupation with procedure
and the rights of the accused, its inability to ensure "just
deserts" for the guilty, its apparent diffidence toward the victims of crime. Liberals incline toward pursuit of a legal Holy
Grail which entails, among other things, acceptance of the
questionable proposition that freeing ninety-nine guilty persons is an acceptable price to pay if it means avoiding the
punishment of a single innocent soul. As Macklin Fleming
has put it, liberals seek a degree of perfection unattainable
this side of paradise. For Fleming, appellate courts are the
major loci of the quest for perfection, and they are responsible for most of what goes awry in criminal proceedings.'
1. G. HAWKINS, THE PRISON: POLICY AND PRACTICE 106 (1976).
2. M. FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE 3-53 (1974). Fleming
was an Associate Justice on the California Court of Appeals from 1964 until 1981.
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Liberals, it appears, are disposed toward finding pre-conviction measures procedurally deficient and post-conviction
responses to crime excessively punitive. For those of radical
persuasion, the entire criminal justice system is an engine of
oppression, consciously designed to operate in that mode by a
small but powerful elite. The system is topsy-turvy. The real
victims are those processed by the system, while the real
criminals are those who built the system and now pull its strings. Meanwhile, the important crimes in a capitalistic society, such as racism, sexism, colonialism, imperialism, and militarism, are largely beyond the reach of the law.' Apart from
judgments spawned by ideological leanings, nothing testifies
more eloquently to the pervasiveness of disenchantment with
the criminal justice system than the fact that even those who
staff the system, flouting a first principle of bureaucracy,
often find wanting the hand that feeds them.
In many instances the disenchantment is rooted in experience and empirical reality. In some quarters, however, it
derives from a veritable mythology that provides an all too
convenient springboard for disparagement of America's
criminal justice system. Close to the heart of the mythology is
mistaken belief that the system is impervious to change. The
historical record shows otherwise. Even cursory examination
of the development of criminal justice in the United States
reveals an undeniable dynamism. Admittedly, many changes
have been superficial, on the order of tinkering, but others
have been quite substantial in scope and impact. The material
written on new directions in criminal proceedings mandated
by the Warren court would fill a small library. Thanks in no
small measure to research by the Vera Institute, the bail system in many jurisdictions has been substantially overhauled.
Increased reliance on release on recognizance and on personal rather than corporate bond have diminished the role of
the bail bondsman and made the eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive bail more reality than abstraction.
Along similar lines, several federal district courts no longer
use deputy marshals to convoy all convicted offenders to correctional facilities. Many, instead, are given the responsibility
of transporting themselves to prison or jail. These examples
represent but a smattering of the modifications incorporated
into criminal justice procedures. Space considerations preclude even listing manifold changes that have taken place in
3.
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See, e.g., B. KRISBERG, CRIME AND PRIVILEGE: TOWARD A NEW CRIMI(1975) and R. QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF CRIME (1970).

JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 2

such areas as probation, parole, and good time.
The work of the reformer-critic of criminal justice is
never really done. Yet it is one thing to press for further
change, quite another to pretend or insist that nothing has
happened, and still another to make one's indictment read
like an embodiment of the old Gallic maxim that the more
things change, the more they remain the same. Among those
unhappy with our correctional system, for example, it is not
uncommon to cite specific facilities, specially the older ones,
as evidence for the system's chronic inertia. A favorite ploy is
to note that many prisons, still in use, date back more than a
century. According to one recent count, twenty-five state
prisons were built before 1875. 4 But while some critics concede, almost grudgingly, improvements in older prison
plants, others convey the impression that these ancient structures still exist in their original primeval state. Seldom are
their prison genealogies accompanied by annotations documenting alterations made over the years. The infamous buckets that once graced the cells of nineteenth century prisons
have long since been replaced by indoor plumbing. Parts of
older prisons, in some instances entire cell blocks, were rendered fallow by court orders or by initiatives taken by prison
officials themselves. Except for strip cells used in many prisons to house incorrigible or potentially suicidal inmates, the
typical contemporary cell has electrical outlets as well as modern plumbing. The point here is that even our oldest bastilles
have undergone physical changes.
I have dwelt on change in the criminal justice system because change and its maternal twin, reform, appear to be the
most salient themes binding together the contributions to
this issue. Each contributor takes up one or more criminal
justice innovations. Some of the changes have been part of
the system for a while, others have barely seen the light of
day. Whatever their vintage, they have generated multi-faceted controversy that extends beyond the merely legal and
into the realms of politics, morals, economics, and sociology.
Thus readers of many disciplinary persuasions will find the
contributions both provocative and instructive.
At least since the Roaring Twenties, America has been
spellbound' by the exploits, real or alleged, of organized
crime and the efforts of law enforcement agencies to suppress
it. This decades old drama has all the elements of a morality
4. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report to
the Nation on Crime and Justice 79 (1983).
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play that lacks a final curtain. Perhaps only in comic strips
can we find similar confrontation between good and evil.
When it comes to organized crime, the list of opposing forces
does not end with Mafia (Cosa Nostra) and agents of the law.
An almost vitriolic opposition has developed between those
who see organized crime as a spectre of the highest rank and
those who contend that its power, influence, and wealth are
greatly exaggerated. 5
Historically, attempts to mount a successful frontal attack
on organized crime were impeded by the absence of legislation making organized crime as such illegal. Organized crime
figures could be prosecuted for specific offenses such as extortion, loan sharking, theft, union racketeering, interstate
gambling, trafficking in drugs, and the like, but not for their
affiliation with a criminal enterprise. Indeed, in some instances it was necessary to fall back on immigration and tax
laws to prosecute individuals allegedly connected with criminal organizations. The latter, despite the creation, in 1954,
of an Organized Crime and Racketeering Section within the
Department of Justice, remained mostly beyond the law's
reach.
A void can be almost as abhorrent to the legal system as
it is to nature. The Organized Crime Act of 1970 was an attempt to fill this statutory void by providing, among other
things, legal means for prosecuting Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations (RICO). In some eyes, the cure was
almost as bad as the disease. Questions have been raised as to
RICO's efficacy, its ability to withstand constitutional test,
and, in sociological terms, its latent dysfunctions. Judge Abner Mikva and Professor G. Robert Blakey address these and
other issues in a vigorous, no-holds-barred debate worthy of
the Oxford Union. Their exchange brings to mind the late
Herbert Packer's dichotomous models of criminal justice
which, despite pulling in opposite directions, simultaneously
animate the system's operation in the United States. The due
process model emphasizes procedural rights at the expense of
efficiency. Packer's metaphor here is an "obstacle course"
whereby each phase of a criminal proceeding impedes progression to the next phase. The crime control model, in contrast, flows from the premise that the repression of crime is
the criminal justice system's primary mission. Metaphorically
5.
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it is an "assembly line" that seldom malfunctions in apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing lawbreakers. Not unexpectedly, the Warren Court is said to exemplify the "due process model," the Burger Court the "crime control model."
However that may be, whether the Mikva-Blakey debate has
a winner and loser, or whether it ends in a draw, will be decided by the reader and by future experiences with the implementation of RICO.
As difficult as it may be to forecast the future of RICO
or any other new development in criminal justice, prediction
is commonplace in all human interaction. Our words and actions presuppose an audience that is listening, watching, and
understanding. Once interaction is initiated, we anticipate or
predict the responses, verbal or behavioral, that our words
and deeds should elicit. Such predictions, needless to say, are
often inaccurate. But error does not deter us from subsequent predictions because in the final analysis human interaction would be chaotic without them.
Marc Miller and Norval Morris, writing on a narrower
plane, rightly note that predictions are routine and necessary
occurrences in the operation of the criminal justice system.
Police decisions to arrest depend largely on whether such action will be approved by superiors, by the prosecutor, and
whether the arrest will stand up in court. Prosecutors shun
going to trial unless there is high probability for securing
convictions. Defense attorneys anticipate whether it is in a client's interest to go to trial or to negotiate outside of court.
With many trial lawyers, it is axiomatic never to put a question to a witness unless the answer is known in advance.
Judges weigh their rulings against the likelihood of reversible
error. At sentencing, any judge worth his or her salt, unless
bound by a statute with mandatory provisions, will try to
foresee the consequences of a sentence suspended or imposed. In short, criminal justice predictions are legion.
Morris can be classified as a neo-retributionist or, in the
prevailing jargon, an adherent to the doctrine of "modified
just deserts." Perhaps it is preferable simply to say that it is
retributionism with flexibility and a heart. Punishment is a
valid response to crime, but sanctions must be proportionate
to the harm done. A neo-retributionist corollary to this principle is that imprisonment should be a punishment of last resort, pretty much restricted to offenders disposed to violence.
Accordingly, incarceration of convicted offenders would
hinge on predictions of the kind of threat they pose toward
their fellow citizens. Predictions of this sort are made daily in
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our criminal courts, but Miller and Morris would like to enhance their power of discrimination. This would entail less
dependence on the clinical diagnoses of psychiatrists and psychologists, and more reliance on predictions based on actuarial methods and the offender's past behavior.
What Miller and Morris are venturing, it seems to me, is
nothing less than a very sophisticated attempt to temper justice and mercy with reason-a challenge fit for the likes of
Solomon. As Miller and Morris readily concede, their proposal borders on the utopian. But in terms of logic alone, it represents an improvement over the legal system's current methods for dealing with dangerousness.
While Miller and Morris look at sentencing in relation to
dangerousness, Ernest W. Schoellkopff's concern is a fair and
rational scheme for sentencing offenders of every stripe. Sentencing, long the bane of criminal court judges, has flirted
with total chaos ever since letting the punishment fit the
crime was supplanted by letting the punishment fit the criminal. Indeed, it may be argued that disparities in sentencing
are direct concomitants of judicial discretion. The latter, in
turn, was born of the desire to individualize punishment. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Schoellkopff contends, accomplished little more than a restatement of the conventional
objectives of sentencing-retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But the Act does not specify how
each objective should be weighed in the sentencing decision.
Instead, it provides for the formation of the United States
Sentencing Commission that will be responsible for developing sentencing norms based on the nature of the offense and
the offender's criminal record. Ultimately, however, application of such norms is left to the sentencing judge's discretion,
which would appear to place the effort to ameliorate the sentencing problem right back in square one.
Schoellkopff's sentencing wish list calls for purpose, priorities, fairness, and the reduction of needless disparity. On
the latter point especially his hope is shared by countless
prison inmates who have experienced firsthand the sting of
disparity. For most inmates a "bum rap" refers not to a claim
of innocence but to a sentence that requires them to do more
time than fellow inmates, including accomplices, who committed the same offense. Disparate sentences are a leading
cause of prisoner discontent, and in many cases a formidable
barrier to rehabilitation. No amount of rhetoric on the need
for individualizing punishment can persuade one armed robber that justice is served by keeping him in prison longer
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than another armed robber housed in the same cell block.
No doubt the Sentencing Commission, to carry out the assignment given to it by Congress, will scour the literature,
solicit expert opinion from the bench, bar, and academia,
and perhaps underwrite some field research on sentencing
patterns in selected jurisdictions. But before the Commission
formulates any recommendations and guidelines, it would be
well advised to test them against the views of those subjected
to sentencing practices-the inmates of our prisons and offenders in various community-based correctional programs.
Although such measures will make for a better informed
Commission, excessive sentencing disparity will likely persist
until the courts and sentencing agencies are shorn of some of
their power of discretion.
To privatize or not to privatize may not be the leading
question among correctional pundits but surely it relates to a
prominent and increasingly popular thrust for correctional
reform. The inspiration for privatization does not come from
the works of Adam Smith or from the rediscovery of the glorious powers of free enterprise. Rather, it is prompted by the
desire to change a system that seems to produce only misery
for those under its heel and despair among those who wish to
make it better. Three of the symposium's contributors are
staunch advocates of privatization. Warren I. Cikins lays out
a case for the privatization of prisons. Jerome G. Miller,
while much in favor of extensive privatization of corrections,
directs our attention to a privatized community correctional
program for offenders who would otherwise be candidates
for incarceration. His "Client-Specific Planning" model
which involves, among other things, close monitoring of subjects and restricting them as little as possible, is already in use
throughout the United States. The article by Diane M. Haller is a brief for extending the role of the private sector in
prison industries and labor. Of special interest is her attempt
to bolster her position with theological views on work.
The historical antecedents for privatization are manifold.
Ordinary citizens once had much the same power to arrest
now reserved to police in the state's hire. Although the gods
more so than human perversity might have dictated the tragedy that occurred at the Ford Theater on April 14, 1865,
Pinkertons rather than Secret Service agents were responsible for guarding President Lincoln. Even today, when the
pursuit of trivia has become a national pastime, few Americans realize that private police far outnumber their federal,
state, and local counterparts. During the nineteenth century

19861

FOREWORD

a substantial portion of prison industry existed in the form of
contract labor or the piece-price system. Both involved leasing inmate labor to private contractors who supplied their
captive workers with the necessary raw materials, tools, and
machinery. Under the piece-price system the prison received
a fixed amount of money for each item produced, but it is
most improbable that much if any of the "profit" went toward improving the lot of the inmate workers. Both plans required the prison staff to maintain custodial control over the
inmates. Under another arrangement, called the lease system,
custodial as well as entrepreneurial services were provided by
private contractors. These early ventures into privatization
probably fattened the purses of the private contractors and
lightened the burdens of prison administrators, but accounts
of nineteenth century prison conditions generally hold that
the prisoners were ill-served by them. Perhaps our standards
of decency and ability to draw legal safeguards have evolved
to a point where privatization during the latter years of the
twentieth century will avoid the failings and exploitation associated with privatization a century or more ago.
Flexibility, efficiency, reduced costs, and greater potential for rehabilitation are among the major justifications for
privatizing corrections. But in all likelihood the great unstated justification is that privatized correctional systems and
programs cannot possibly be worse than those run by the
state. It is much too early to deem one approach superior to
the other. Before any verdict is reached there must be a sizable body of rigorous evaluative research that can enable us to
make intelligent choices. Such research, besides hewing to
proper methodological and statistical techniques, should always be conducted by researchers with no ties to the program
or policy under study. And the chips should be allowed to fall
where they may. The research might show that privatization
yields better results, that it is simply on par with public sector
corrections, that certain programs and types of offenders are
more amenable to privatization than others, or even that in
some circumstances privatization does more harm than good.
Although the issues surrounding attorney's fees is not
within my field of professional competence, Lincoln Stone's
article on the forfeiture of fees deals with an altogether fascinating subject. Obviously, meddling with attorney's fees is a
touchy subject, as evidenced by the bar's reactions to recent
efforts to cap liability awards. Equally obvious, perhaps, the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 was drafted by a lawyer, or team of lawyers, whose remuneration was salary
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rather than fee generated. And why shouldn't lawyers become exercised when confronted with the prospect of seeing
their fees limited or, worse, forfeited? Stone may be correct
in arguing that the Forfeiture Act is unconstitutional, but unless the law is allowed to become dormant, its use by prosecutors will create a legal and ethical morass that will never go
away. A single conundrum might hint at where such a law
can lead: If an attorney must forfeit tainted money received
from a client for legal services, why not require a grocer or
car dealer patronized by that client to give the state any
money that the lawyer's client pays for their wares? In terms
of Herbert Packer's models of the criminal justice system, the
Forfeiture Act represents a triumph of crime control over
due process. But in terms of criminal justice realities, it remains to be seen whether the law will have significant bearing
on the prosecution of organized crime.

